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The Founders, Executive Power, 
and Military Intervention 
 
Christopher A. Preble 
 
During the long periods of peace in the nineteenth century 
and the early twentieth century, the United States maintained 
a small standing army, mobilized additional personnel to fight 
the few wars declared by Congress, and then sent most of the 
men home when the war was won.  This pattern was 
established during the earliest days of the Republic and was 
driven by the Founders‟ ambivalent view of military power. 
James Madison conceived of warfare as a kind of petri dish 
for the expansion of state power at the expense of the 
individual.  “Of all the enemies to public liberty,” he wrote in 
1795, “war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it 
comprises and develops the germ of every other.”1  “No nation,” 
Madison continued, “could preserve its freedom in the midst of 
continual warfare.”2  He was hardly alone.  As one scholar 
explained, “[t]he vast majority of America‟s landowning 
aristocracy had an almost congenital distrust of standing 
armies, which their ancestors for generations had identified 
with despotism . . . .  They glorified instead the yeoman 
militiamen, linked to the land and closely tied to local 
interests.”3 
This philosophy came up against a bitter truth.  On the 
one hand, the Founders realized that their ability to prevail 
militarily against the British during the Revolution had been 
 
 Christopher A. Preble is the Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the 
Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.  He is the author of THE POWER PROBLEM: 
HOW AMERICAN MILITARY DOMINANCE MAKES US LESS SAFE, LESS PROSPEROUS, 
AND LESS FREE (2009), from which this article is adapted.  The author wishes 
to thank Caitlyn Korb for her assistance with this article.  The views 
expressed in this article are those of the author. 
1. JAMES MADISON, Political Observations, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 485, 491-92 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1865). 
2. Id. at 492. 
3. BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND THE RISE OF THE STATE: THE MILITARY 
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICS 250 (1994). 
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instrumental to securing their independence.  On the other 
hand, the presence of British troops in their midst was among 
the list of particulars that Thomas Jefferson cited in the 
Declaration of Independence for wanting to be free of the 
mother country in the first place.  The Constitution resolved 
the tension between the necessity for a military for self-
defense, and the fear that a large military would undermine 
the delicate balance between the citizens and the state, by 
establishing clear criteria for limiting the likelihood that the 
nation would become engaged in foreign wars. 
This Article explores the evolution of American military 
and foreign policy over the past two centuries by highlighting a 
departure from what the Founders had envisioned and 
intended.  The end result—a massive military and an 
interventionist foreign policy—has created a persistent 
imbalance between the different branches of government.  This 
Article will follow this course of development by highlighting 
the crucial points where America‟s national security policy 
shifted, and by analyzing the political and social consequences 
of these changes.  I will then proceed to draw parallels between 
the current policy of the United States and the Founders‟ 
original fears concerning where military interventionism would 
take the country.  I will argue that an interventionist foreign 
policy is not necessary within the context of a contemporary 
international political economy.  I will demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the few unsuccessful attempts to correct the 
imbalance of power that exists among the branches of 
American government.  As a solution to this imbalance, I will 
reevaluate the proper role of the military in American society 
and propose the establishment of four new criteria concerning 
the use of force.  The United States military should be deployed 
abroad only when: 1) the United States‟ national security 
interests are at stake; 2) there is a clear, national consensus 
behind the mission after the public is made aware of both the 
costs and the benefits of intervening militarily; 3) clear and 
obtainable military objectives have been defined prior to 
intervening; and 4) all reasonable steps to resolve the problem 
have been exhausted (i.e., force is used only as a last resort). 
I will conclude by demonstrating how the implementation 
of such criteria would pave the way for a new international 
order that is less dependent upon American military 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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dominance.  This order would be characterized by a more 
equitable distribution of responsibility among nations 
regarding security challenges and a military role for the United 
States that better aligns with our national interest and our 
political culture. 
 
I.  Intent of the Founders 
 
Understanding the political philosophy of the Founders 
provides the necessary context for interpreting their actions 
and motivations during the early days of the Republic.  This 
section analyzes the framework put into place by the Founding 
Fathers and their intentions regarding the young nation‟s 
military structure.  It will also explain the Founders‟ fears 
regarding warfare and militarism, and the precautions they 
took to protect liberty in response.  The most important of 
these precautions was the steps they took to impede the 
Government‟s capacity for waging war.  The Founders enacted 
measures to prevent the growth of permanent armies and 
focused their efforts on limiting the power of the one branch of 
government that they feared would be most warlike—the 
Executive. 
 
A. Stemming Military Buildup 
 
The Founders‟ deep skepticism toward standing armies 
manifested itself in the United States Constitution, which 
granted Congress the power “to provide and maintain a Navy,”4 
but stipulated that armies would be raised and supported as 
needed,5 essentially implying that there would be no standing 
army.  This was not so radical a provision at the time.  Most 
countries in the late eighteenth century chose to rely on a small 
number of professional soldiers, including mercenaries for hire, 
who would then be augmented by private citizens as conditions 
required.  For countries such as England, there was no great 
need for any army because it had a relatively small population 
 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (emphasis added). 
5. Id. § 8, cl. 12.  The Constitution also stipulated that appropriations for 
the Army would not be for more than two years; no similar restrictions 
applied to the Navy.  Id. § 8, cl. 12-13. 
3
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resting comfortably and securely on an island abundant in 
natural resources and it was protected from foreign invasion by 
water on all sides, 
Bolstered by their personal experiences, the American 
colonists inherited their forefathers‟ skepticism of standing 
armies.  They also drew on traditions reaching back to 
antiquity.  The underlying logic embedded within the 
precautions imposed by the new Constitution was that 
standing armies and the endangerment of liberty went hand-
in-hand.  While addressing the Constitutional Convention, 
James Madison declared: 
 
A standing military force, with an overgrown 
Executive will not long be safe companions to 
liberty.  The means of defence against foreign 
danger, have been always the instruments of 
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a 
standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a 
revolt was apprehended.  Throughout all Europe, 
the armies kept up under the pretext of 
defending, have enslaved the people.6 
 
Madison‟s words were echoed by his contemporaries in 
numerous State conventions and constitutions.  For instance, 
Patrick Henry lamented the difficulty of holding a standing 
militia legally accountable by asking “[w]ill your mace-bearer 
be a match for a disciplined regiment?”7  Additionally, the state 
constitutions of Virginia and North Carolina explicitly affirmed 
the belief that “standing armies in time[s] of peace are 
dangerous to liberty” and provided for the “strict 
subordination” of the military to the civil power.8  Moreover, in 
 
6. James Madison, Address to the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 
1787), in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 465 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911). 
7. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN'S LETTER, YATES'S MINUTES, 
CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS, VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF '98-'99, 
AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 51 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1907) (1845). 
8. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia (June 26, 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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his farewell address, George Washington warned his 
countrymen to “avoid the necessity of . . . overgrown military 
establishments.”9 
 
B. Distribution of War Powers among Branches of 
Government 
 
Critical to avoiding the need for such “overgrown military 
establishments” was the Constitution‟s provision that 
Congress—not the Executive—would have the authority to 
declare war.10  With memories of George III‟s abuses fresh in 
their minds, and fearing that an American king would be 
similarly inclined to infringe upon individual liberties, the 
Founders took particular care to limit the President‟s war-
making powers.  Madison explained the rationale in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson, when he declared that “[t]he constitution 
supposes, what the History of all [Governments] demonstrates, 
that the [Executive] is the branch of power most interested in 
war, & most prone to it.  It has accordingly with studied care, 
vested the question of war in the [Legislature].”11  In the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, James Wilson explained 
that “[t]his system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to 
guard against it.  It will not be in the power of a single man, or 
a single body of men, to involve us in such distress . . . .”12  
Madison later deemed this provision as perhaps the most 
important one of the entire document, asserting that “[i]n no 
 
1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-1870, at 380 (Wash., D.C., Dep‟t of State 1894), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratva.asp#1.  
Subsequent state constitutions which echoed these words include Vermont, 
Ohio, Kansas, and Nevada. 
9. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
11. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1790-1802: COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS 
AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING HIS NUMEROUS LETTERS AND 
DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 311, 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1906). 
12. James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention 
(Dec. 11, 1787), in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, 
at 417 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick Dawson Stone eds., Lancaster, 
Hist. Soc‟y of Pa.  1888), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch7s17.html. 
5
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part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the 
clause which confides the question of war or peace to the 
legislature, and not to the executive department.”13 
Even so strong an advocate of executive authority as 
Alexander Hamilton conceded that the legislature alone 
possessed the power to initiate wars, whereas the President‟s 
powers were confined to “the direction of war when authorized 
or begun.”14  When anti-Federalists claimed that Hamilton and 
other advocates of the new federal Constitution were 
attempting to create an office of the executive with the powers 
of a king, Hamilton responded with emphasis: 
 
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the 
army and navy of the United States.  In this 
respect his authority would be nominally the 
same with that of the king of Great Britain, but 
in substance much inferior to it.  It would 
amount to nothing more than the supreme 
command and direction of the military and naval 
forces, as first General and admiral of the 
Confederacy; while that of the British king 
extends to the declaring of war and to the raising 
and regulating of fleets and armies—all which, 
by the Constitution under consideration, would 
appertain to the legislature.15 
 
Several years later, Hamilton and Madison were locked in 
a bitter debate over a particular exercise of executive power: 
Washington‟s declaration of impartiality in the war between 
England and France.  Madison forcefully reminded his 
interlocutor that “the power to declare war, including the 
power of judging of the causes of war, is fully and exclusively 
vested in the legislature; that the executive has no right, in any 
 
13. James Madison, Helvidius, Letter No. 4, GAZETTE U.S., Sept. 14, 
1793, reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 11, at 171, 
174. 
14. GENE HEALY, THE CULT OF THE PRESIDENCY: AMERICA‟S DANGEROUS 
DEVOTION TO EXECUTIVE POWER 24 (2008) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 2003) (emphasis in original). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for 
declaring war.”16  The President‟s sole role was to call Congress 
into session and inform it of the circumstances so that the 
legislature—not the President—could make a decision on the 
wisdom or imprudence of war.17 
Such sentiments strike many today as unnecessarily 
unwieldy, and perhaps even dangerous; perhaps some in the 
late eighteenth century believed much the same thing.  By 
fortunate circumstances as much as by design, however, a 
foreign and military policy founded on—in Jefferson‟s immortal 
words from his first inaugural address—“peace, commerce, and 
honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with 
none,” survived and thrived in North America.18 
 
II.  Patterns of Change in American Foreign Policy 
 
For much of the first 140 years of the nation‟s history, 
Americans were rather successful at staying out of unnecessary 
wars.  In accordance with the hopes of the Constitution‟s 
Framers, America therefore had little need for a large military.  
When Congress saw fit to declare war, as on the few occasions 
from the War of 1812 to World War II, it did so while 
simultaneously making provisions to raise the necessary 
numbers of men and materials.  It was not simply ideology and 
a commitment to adhering to the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution that enabled this pattern to persist for so long. 
The United States was also blessed by a dearth of powerful 
enemies.  In the span of twenty years at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century, the United States had convinced three 
European powers to largely quit their respective portions of 
North America: Jefferson bought off the French with the 
Louisiana Purchase, the Americans outlasted the British in the 
War of 1812, and the Spanish ceded Florida in the Adams-Onís 
Treaty of 1819.  On December 2, 1823, President James 
 
16. Madison, supra note 13, at 174 (emphasis in original). 
17. Notably, although Alexander sided with Washington and the 
executive, and nominally against Madison and the Congress, in this dispute, 
he never challenged the fundamental premise that the power to initiate war 
rested solely with the legislature. 
18. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available 
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. 
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Monroe declared that the European powers were not to 
interfere in the affairs of any independent nation of the 
Western Hemisphere.19  In return, the Monroe Doctrine 
pledged that the United States would remain neutral in 
disputes between the European states.20 
Monroe‟s bold stand against further colonization in the 
Americas would not have stood if tested.  The United States 
Government lacked any formal authority to be the guarantor of 
independence for the new nations in the Western hemisphere.  
Still small, the country lacked the power to back up Monroe‟s 
claim to such authority, had any European power sought to 
challenge it.  But Europe generally left the Americas alone.  
Exhausted by the Napoleonic Wars, and fearful of domestic 
disturbances that might overturn the established social and 
political order, the Europeans set their eyes on conquests in 
Africa and Asia; Europe generally left the Americas alone.21  
The good fortune for the United States was that the young 
nation developed during this peculiar period in human history, 
and that it had a few wise leaders who had the sense to take 
advantage of this “splendid isolation” to build an enduring 
nation-state.  The greatest threat to the Republic in the 
nineteenth century therefore came not from foreign threats but 
rather from the Civil War, which remains the costliest war in 
our history. 
 
A. The Exceptions 
 
There were a few exceptions to the United States‟ lack of 
involvement in foreign affairs.  Congress declared war on 
Mexico in 1846, and again on Spain in 1898.  From the former, 
the nation acquired California and Texas, along with parts of 
five other states; from the latter, the United States acquired 
the Philippines. 
The experience in the Philippines, where the U.S. Army 
struggled to subdue a stubborn insurgency, was consistent with 
 
19. See WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, PROMISED LAND, CRUSADER STATE: THE 
AMERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE WORLD SINCE 1776, at 57-75 (1997). 
20. See id. 
21. In another fortunate twist of fate, British policy generally coincided 
with United States‟ preferences in the Western Hemisphere. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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a pattern.22  Throughout the United States‟ history, we can see 
a pendulum swing of enthusiasm for, swiftly followed by 
disgust with, war.  Such shifting attitudes reflect Americans‟ 
collective ability to learn—and then over time forget—the high 
costs of combat and conquest.  Indeed, the bitter experience in 
the Philippines soured Theodore Roosevelt, one of the most 
fervent advocates of military adventurism.  In 1897, he told a 
friend “I should welcome almost any war, for I think this 
country needs one.”23  Within a year, Roosevelt got his war, as 
the United States battled the decrepit and dying Spanish 
Empire.24  Roosevelt‟s enthusiasm for expanding the nascent 
American Empire, however, cooled considerably after he 
became President in September 1901.  Urged to seize the 
Dominican Republic, Roosevelt quipped, “I have about the 
same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have 
to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to.”25  The formerly 
outspoken booster of the American Empire, Roosevelt became 
disillusioned with foreign conquests.  This demonstrates how 
the realities of warfare and subsequent occupation inevitably 
dampened American enthusiasm for foreign military 
intervention. 
Nearly every generation in American history had some 
experience with war.  In each case, ambition and optimism 
about the likelihood of quick success was eventually replaced 
with humility and pessimism, an appreciation of the costs, and 
of the possibility of failure.  Once these lessons sunk in, 
Americans generally returned to the core underlying 
philosophy—espoused by the Founders—that free nations 
possess small professional militaries and strive to avoid foreign 
wars.  Americans, however, were happy to profit from foreign 
trade and to otherwise serve as an example to the world by 
upholding the highest ideals of liberal governance. 
 
 
22. On the U.S. Army in the Philippines, see BRIAN MCALLISTER LINN, 
THE U.S. ARMY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902 
(2000). 
23. Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War (PBS television 
broadcast 1999).  See also Crucible of Empire—PBS Online, 
http://www.pbs.org/crucible/frames/_film.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
24. See, e.g., Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War, supra note 
23; Crucible of Empire—PBS Online, supra note 23. 
25. John B. Judis, Imperial Amnesia, 143 FOREIGN POL‟Y 50, 54 (2004). 
9
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III.  Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century 
 
This model persisted in the first half of the twentieth 
century, even as the United States became involved in far 
larger wars in distant lands.  World War I claimed 116,000 
American lives; World War II more than three-and-a-half times 
that number.26  Attitudes toward a standing military began to 
change in the years after World War II, and a new model took 
root that has endured since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991.  This part of the Article will evaluate the effect that the 
Red Scare and the subsequent rise of the Cold War had upon 
America‟s grand strategy.  In addition, this part will further 
consider the political, economic, and societal changes brought 
about by this strategic transformation. 
The process began within a few years after the end of 
World War II.  The nation had barely completed its 
demobilization after Japan surrendered when it found itself at 
war again, this time in a former Japanese colony and against a 
new enemy, the People‟s Republic of China.  Nearly six million 
Americans served in the military during the Korean War, 
without Congress ever having actually declared war.27  By 
1960, the United States seemed to have settled into a 
permanent state of near-war against Communist regimes in 
the Soviet Union and China.  America‟s leaders waged bloody 
proxy wars in Southeast Asia and conducted murky covert 
operations from Iran to Guatemala.  Most importantly, the 
United States conscripted millions of men into an enormous 
standing army and mobilized millions more to design and build 
the implements of war. 
This development greatly disturbed President Dwight 
David Eisenhower.  He shared the Founders‟ concerns that a 
constant state of war would alter the nation‟s character in 
profound ways.  As he prepared to leave the White House after 
two successful terms, Eisenhower took to the airwaves to warn 
his countrymen to be on guard against a “military-industrial 
 
26. ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA OBOROCEANU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: TABLES AND STATISTICS 
2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf (citing 
116,516 total deaths in World War I and 405,399 total deaths in World War 
II). 
27. Id. at 3 (citing 5,720,000 serving troops). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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complex” acquiring “unwarranted influence” in the halls of 
power.28  He continued as follows: 
 
We must never let the weight of this 
combination endanger our liberties or democratic 
processes. We should take nothing for granted 
only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can 
compel the proper meshing of huge industrial 
and military machinery of defense with our 
peaceful methods and goals, so that security and 
liberty may prosper together.29 
 
Eisenhower correctly recognized that, whereas America‟s 
economic interests had once broadly favored peace, by the time 
he left office, crucial segments of industry and entire regions of 
the country had become heavily dependent on the sales of arms 
and equipment to the United States military.30 
Eisenhower reminded his countrymen that the 
“conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large 
arms industry” was a new development in the nation‟s 
history.31  He implored them to be on guard against it even as 
its influence was “felt in every city, every state house, every 
office of the Federal government.”32  That such a vast and 
permanent arms industry was necessary, as Eisenhower 
believed it was, did not mean that the country should merely 
accept it as a given.  On the contrary, he explained, “we must 
not fail to comprehend its grave implications.  Our toil, 
resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very 
structure of our society.”33  However, only after the Cold War 
had ended would the United States learn how right 
Eisenhower had been. 
 
 
28. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address (Jan. 
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A. Transitioning to a Unipolar World 
 
When the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the United States 
enjoyed a modest peace dividend and cut defense spending by 
more than twenty-six percent.34  By 1999, defense spending as 
a share of the Gross Domestic Product had fallen to three 
percent, its lowest level since 1940.35  Some companies 
transitioned away from the manufacture of arms; others simply 
disappeared.  Some of the monies that had once gone to the 
military were redirected elsewhere—to reduce the federal 
deficit, to provide for modest tax relief, and to provide for 
similarly modest increases in total non-defense spending. 
One might have expected far deeper cuts in military 
spending.  After all, the great threat of global communism was 
gone, and nearly everything that the United States military 
had been preparing to do during the Cold War had been 
overcome.  Building weapons, however, was a lucrative 
business and continued to be lucrative during the 1990s for 
those companies that survived the first few rounds of cuts.  
Political pressures and bureaucratic inertia—precisely the 
military-industrial complex that Eisenhower had warned of 
three decades earlier—kept military spending much higher 
than necessary.  Instead, the United States military machine 
remained largely intact, albeit as a leaner, more focused 
version of its prior self.  Equally important, the United States 
kept many of its overseas bases and retained, even expanded, 
security commitments under alliances ostensibly created to 
contain a now defunct Soviet Empire. 
 
B. Changes on the Home Front 
 
As Eisenhower had predicted, the creation of a permanent 
armaments industry during the Cold War created similarly 
permanent political constituencies that objected to cuts in the 
military, or at least to cuts in the particular part of the military 
that happened to affect them directly.  Whereas Americans had 
 
34. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV‟T: 
HISTORICAL TABLES 118-25 (2008), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/hist.pdf. 
35. Total defense outlays in constant (2000) dollars were $382.7 billion 
in 1990 and bottomed out at $282.4 billion in 1998.  See id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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once armed for war and then returned to peaceful pursuits 
when the wars ended, they now armed for the sake of arming.  
Every weapons system had its defenders in Congress, and 
every community could come up with a dozen reasons for why 
their military base should not be cut.  Meanwhile, policymakers 
in Washington who were in possession of this great power, and 
who were no longer dependent upon public support for such 
missions, looked for places to use America‟s military power.  
Unconstrained by the fear that was so rampant during the 
Cold War, that even small-scale wars might spiral into a full-on 
confrontation with the other superpower, the United States 
was suddenly free to engage in military interventions that only 
a few years earlier would have seemed, if not impossible, at 
least highly risky.  For many in Washington, the temptation to 
use this power became nearly impossible to resist. 
 
C. Ad Hoc Interventionism 
 
Possessing enormous military power, the United States 
could decide whether or not to get involved in a new conflict 
based on a number of different factors, including the domestic 
political mood or an especially effective media outreach 
campaign.  Sometimes a particular interest on the part of the 
President alone was sufficient, and these feelings were subject 
to change.36 
The occasions in which the U.S. military was deployed 
abroad thus had an ad hoc quality about them; they seemed 
purely reactive to world events, rather than part of a broader 
 
36. See FRED KAPLAN, DAYDREAM BELIEVERS: HOW A FEW GRAND IDEAS 
WRECKED AMERICAN POWER 140-41 (2008).  For example: 
 
In his first few years as president, Bill Clinton justified 
staying out of Slobodan Milosevic‟s brutal war in Yugoslavia 
by citing Robert Kaplan‟s book Balkan Ghosts, which 
argued that ethnic wars had consumed the region for 
centuries and there was nothing we could do about them.  
Later, . . . [Clinton] justified intervening after all by citing 
Michael Sells‟ The Bridge Betrayed: Reform and Genocide in 
Bosnia, which argued that ethnic conflict had ebbed and 
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American campaign to shape the world order to suit its 
interests.  Moreover, the use of the military seemed oddly 
discriminating, albeit according to criteria that defied simple 
explanations.  There had been interventions in Africa, the 
Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Southwest Asia, as the 
United States military had gone into Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 
1994, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999.  But Washington 
chose to stay out of Rwanda in 1994 and refused to step into 
the middle of a dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia from 
1998 to 2000.  It also passed on intervening in the Central 
African Republic in 1996, in Albania in 1997, and in Sierra 
Leone in 1999.  As some in Washington belatedly came to 
recognize, with great power also came a plethora of ethical 
dilemmas regarding the use or non-use of that power. 
 
IV. A Persistent Imbalance within our System of Government 
 
Military intervention has, in turn, created a permanent 
imbalance between the different branches of government, with 
the Executive clearly dominant over Congress and the 
Judiciary.  The Founders worried that wars would give rise to 
an overgrown military establishment that would upset the 
delicate balance between the three branches of government, as 
well as between the Government and the People.  Their careful 
reading of history, as well as their own personal experiences, 
confirmed their worst fears.  A government instituted to 
preserve liberties could swiftly come to subvert them.  This 
Section will show how the system that the Founders put into 
place failed to live up to their hopes, and it details the 
unsuccessful attempts that have been made to remedy the 
resulting imbalance within our Government. 
 
A. Prophecy Fulfilled 
 
A gloomy Thomas Jefferson once opined, “[t]he natural 
progress of things is for liberty to yield & government to gain 
ground.”37  The evidence to support Jefferson‟s dour claim is 
 
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (May 27, 1788), 
in JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS 363, 364 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball 
eds., 1999). 
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irrefutable.  Throughout human history, government has 
grown during wartime or other periods of great anxiety, and it 
rarely surrenders these powers when the crisis abates.  For 
instance, the government instituted federal income tax 
withholding during World War II, which remains in effect 
today;38  it took over 108 years to effectively repeal the federal 
excise tax on long-distance telephone calls, a tax ostensibly 
enacted to pay for the Spanish-American War, which lasted 
less than six months;39 and New York City rent controls, which 
were enacted in 1943 out of fear of war-related housing 
shortages, continue to burden both landlords and tenants.40  
Considering the question more holistically, “the nonmilitary 
sectors of the federal government actually grew at a faster rate 
in World War II than under the impetus of the New Deal!”41  
All aspects of state power expand during times of war, 
including those that have nothing to do with actually fighting 
and winning battles on land or sea. 
 
B. Systemic Shortcomings 
 
In retrospect, the Founders‟ intention that Congress would 
control the power to declare war might have been doomed from 
the outset.  Madison may have genuinely believed that 
Congressional control over the war powers was the most 
important provision within the entire Constitution, but one of 
his successors recognized Congress‟s relative powerlessness in 
this department rather well.  In 1846, President James K. Polk 
 
38. Pub. L. No. 78-68, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126 (1943). 
39. Pub. L. No. 55-133, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 460 (1898).  Although the law 
was never formally repealed, the Internal Revenue Service ceased collection 
of the tax in 2006.  Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Government to 
Stop Collecting Long-Distance Telephone Tax (May 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=157706,00.html. 
40. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 421, ch. 26, 56 
Stat. 23 (repealed 1947).  See also Walter Block, Rent Control, in THE 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 442, 444 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d 
ed. 2008) (stating that such policies have “led to decay and abandonment 
throughout the entire five boroughs of the city”).  For a historical account of 
rent control in New York City, see Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the 
World As We Know It (And I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York City 
and the Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1125 (2004). 
41. PORTER, supra note 3, at 280 (emphasis in original). 
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sent American troops into territory claimed jointly by Mexico 
and the United States.  Congress declared war when Mexican 
forces attacked a contingent under General Zachary Taylor‟s 
command,42 thereby handing Polk the conflict he sought.  Two 
years later, Congress formally censured Polk for exceeding his 
constitutional authority,43 but by then the damage had already 
been done.  In a letter to his law partner in Illinois, Republican 
Abraham Lincoln noted: 
 
Allow the President to invade a neighboring 
nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to 
repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, 
whenever he may choose to say he deems it 
necessary for such purpose—and you allow him 
to make war at pleasure. . . . 
 
The provision of the Constitution giving the 
war making power to Congress, was dictated, as 
I understand it, by the following reasons.  Kings 
had always been involving and impoverishing 
their people in wars, pretending generally, if not 
always, that the good of the people was the 
object.  This, our Convention understood to be 
the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; 
and they resolved to so frame the Constitution 
that no one man should hold the power of 
bringing this oppression upon us.44 
 
That was the intention, and yet Polk prevailed.  Since the 
end of World War II, a succession of American Presidents 
stretching from Harry Truman to George W. Bush have 
involved the United States in wars, often without so much as a 
nod to Congressional authority.  Moreover, they sometimes did 
so in direct opposition to the public‟s wishes. 
For instance, on rare occasions, Congress has passed 
 
42. Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9. 
43. 43 J. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1, 184 (1848) (30th Cong., 1st 
Sess.). 
44. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), 
in LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 175, 175-76 (Don E. 
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (emphasis in original). 
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resolutions objecting to the introduction of American troops 
into a particular conflict, only to be summarily ignored.  In 
November 1995, the Republican-controlled Congress voted by a 
margin of 243 to 171 to prevent President Bill Clinton from 
sending American forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.45  Clinton sent them anyway.  
Congress mounted no serious campaign to bring the troops 
home, and it is difficult to see how it would have succeeded.  
Efforts in recent years by the Democratic-controlled Congress 
to bring an end to the war in Iraq repeatedly failed.  Ironically, 
the Iraqi Parliament appears to have had more influence over 
the disposition of American troops in Iraq than the United 
States Congress.  Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
submitted the United States-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement 
to the Iraqi Parliament for ratification and to the Presidency 
Council for unanimous approval.46  The agreement, however, 
was negotiated and signed by President George W. Bush with 
hardly any Congressional involvement, ostensibly because it 
did not rise to the level of a formal treaty requiring Senate 
ratification.47  Thus, Madison‟s system for constraining 
executive power has failed to live up to his expectations. 
 
C. Addressing the Imbalance 
 
Madison‟s concerns, meanwhile, have proved prescient.  
Our responses to recurring crises—both real and imagined—
have fundamentally altered the balance of power.  This pattern 
of behavior has been challenged along the way, but the 
Judiciary and Congress are both less capable of checking 
presidential power precisely because of the existence of a large 
and permanent military establishment.  In the past, when 
 
45. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace 
Settlement, art. 1, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Dec. 14, 1995). 
46. Agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces From Iraq 
and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in 
Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_ 
vault/SE_SOFA.pdf.  See also generally, e.g., Sean Foley, The Iraqi Status-of-
Forces Agreement, Iran, and Guantanamo Bay, 34 RUTGERS L. REC. 39 (2009). 
47. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall have 
the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
treaties”). 
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given the power to launch military action—at any place, and at 
any time—Presidents have regularly seized the opportunities.  
The vast majority of cases in which the United States military 
has been deployed abroad since the end of World War II have 
not come about by virtue of Congressional action following 
months, or even weeks, of public debate. 
In 1973, Congress attempted to recover some of its 
prerogatives in the War Powers Act,48 but it has ultimately 
failed to constrain the President‟s ability to wage war.  The 
pattern is familiar: the President as Commander-in-Chief 
sends the military into a particular hot spot, the news cameras 
capture footage of the troops landing, and then the White 
House notifies Congress that action has been taken.  Long 
before the provisions of the War Powers Act took effect, 
Congress either endorsed the mission, or it came to an end.49 
In a few cases, Congress has passed wartime 
authorizations, ostensibly granting the President the right to 
wage war at his discretion,50 but these actions merely reveal 
the depths of Congressional weakness.  Members of Congress 
take an oath of office not so dissimilar to that of the President 
because all pledge to uphold the Constitution.51  Senators or 
representatives cannot in good conscience vote to unilaterally 
abrogate their duties and responsibilities to declare war as 
 
48. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1541-48 (2006)). 
49. In July 2008, a commission led by former Secretaries of State James 
Baker and Warren Christopher recommended changes to the War Powers 
Act, but Congress has not taken action as of yet.  See generally Karen 
DeYoung, Ex-Secretaries Suggest New War Powers Policy, WASH. POST, July 
9, 2008, at A10.  For a critical view of the Baker-Christopher 
recommendations, see Louis Fisher, The Law: The Baker-Christopher War 
Powers Commission, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 128 (2009). 
50. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 77 (1991) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 
Stat. 3) (“Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces 
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678”) (first Gulf 
War); H.R.J. Res. 114 (2002) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 107-243) (“Joint 
Resolution to Authorize the use of United States Armed Force against Iraq”) 
(2002 Iraq War). 
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the execution of his 
office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: „I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United 
States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.‟); U.S. CONST. art. VI (“The Senators and 
Representatives before mentioned . . . shall be bound by oath or affirmation, 
to support this Constitution . . . .”). 
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stipulated in the Constitution any more than they can hand 
over to the President any of the other powers listed in Article I, 
Section 8, including the right to levy taxes,52 establish rules for 
the United States armed forces,53 and regulate interstate 
commerce and trade with foreign nations.54 
 
V.  Costs of a Modern Military 
 
This subtle shift in the character of our system of 
government is one of the many costs of our military power.  It 
is a cost that is harder to measure than what we spend every 
year on our military, or on our wars, but is far more significant 
over the long term.  In this part, I will evaluate two arguments 
in favor of a large military establishment in light of the modern 
international context.  I will conclude that these arguments 
underestimate the costs of such an apparatus in terms of 
liberty.  Furthermore, I will assert that a presumption against 
using force would make America more secure and would 
ultimately produce a more peaceful international order. 
 
A. A Necessary Evil? 
 
Many Americans who favor a large military engaged in 
numerous missions around the world concede that executive 
power grows during periods of crisis and threat.  Times, 
however, have changed so dramatically since the founding of 
the Republic that Americans need no longer be concerned with 
the Founders‟ warnings.  Robert F. Turner, co-founder of the 
University of Virginia‟s Center for National Security Law, 
makes the case that Congress‟s war powers are a “moribund 
anachronism” because the world community has since outlawed 
the “adventuristic policies” which motivated the Founders to 
create this check in the first place.55  As others have noted, the 
Constitution is not a suicide pact.56  The world is a dangerous 
 
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
55. Robert F. Turner, The War on Terrorism and the Modern Relevance 
of the Congressional Power to “Declare War”, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 519, 
537 (2002). 
56. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, at v 
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place.  There are people out there who wish to do us harm, and 
we must kill them before they kill us.  In effect, such 
arguments presume that political leaders are entitled to 
selectively circumvent the Constitution in order to confront 
imminent threats. 
 
B. An Evil at All? 
 
Others contend that the accumulation of power into the 
hands of a single person—more specifically, the President‟s 
ability to wage war unencumbered by Congress—is not only 
necessary, but is in fact a positive power.  Some go so far as to 
argue that the Founders never really intended for Congress to 
control the war powers in the first place. 
For example, John Yoo, a law professor at the University of 
California, Berkeley, who served in the Justice Department‟s 
Office of Legal Counsel during the George W. Bush 
administration, has consistently argued that the President‟s 
inherent power to wage war is essentially unlimited.57  Yoo 
does not, however, appear to understand the motivations, 
hopes, and fears that informed the federalist experiment.  He 
essentially ignores the concern that war was a vehicle whereby 
governments infringed upon individual liberty, and he 
therefore misapprehends why the Founders sought to limit 
their new government‟s propensity to wage war. 
Ultimately, Yoo‟s interpretation reveals a particular 
philosophy of governing and of the utility of military force that 
the Founders explicitly rejected.  Yoo seems well aware of this 
fact.  The confluence of “rogue states,” terrorist organizations 
and weapons of mass destruction, he explains, requires a very 
different conception of warfare and war powers than the one 
the Founders envisioned.58  Although he does not necessarily 
concede that there are constitutional limits on the President‟s 
war powers, to the extent that such restrictions do exist, Yoo 
 
(2006) (explaining that the phrase derives from Supreme Court Justice 
Robert H. Jackson‟s dissenting opinion in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1 (1949), and was repeated in Justice Arthur Goldberg‟s majority 
opinion in the case Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)). 
57. See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at x (2005). 
58. See YOO, supra note 57, at 1-29. 
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would remove them.  Given the threats of the twenty-first 
century, Yoo writes that “we should not adopt a warmaking 
process that contains a built-in presumption against using 
force abroad.”59 
 
C. Undermining Liberty, Jeopardizing Security 
 
Actually, such a presumption against using force abroad 
would keep America reasonably prosperous and secure.  United 
States policymakers have the capacity to intervene in dozens of 
places around the world, but our recent experience has shown 
that such interventions often undermine U.S. security.  
Military intervention is usually irrelevant when dealing with 
non-state actors such as al-Qaeda.  In many cases, it is actually 
worse than irrelevant—it is counterproductive.  Although there 
may be occasions when military force is required to eliminate 
an urgent threat to national security, and we must therefore 
maintain a strong military to deal with such threats, our 
capacity for waging war far exceeds that which is required for 
such contingencies. 
 
VI. The Proper Role of the Military in  
Modern American Society 
 
Here again, the Founders‟ wisdom is apparent.  They were 
deeply skeptical of warfare‟s capacity for effecting good ends.  
Benjamin Franklin declared that “there never was a good war, 
or a bad peace.”60  They held such views despite the fact that 
they had all lived through a war that gave them what they 
most desired—the freedom to construct a new political order 
apart from the British monarchy.  These patriots, to a person, 
would have much preferred that the same ends be achieved by 
other means.  Today, although America‟s power is ostensibly 
intended to keep its people safe, the fact that it has more power 
than it needs actually makes the country less safe.  Given this 
paradox, the United States should reduce its military power 
 
59. Id. at x (emphasis added). 
60. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Sir Joseph Banks (July 27, 1783), 
in 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: 1706-1790, at 73, 74 (Albert Henry 
Smyth ed., MacMillan 1907). 
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and adopt a new, more circumspect attitude toward the use of 
force in order to better protect its homeland and way of life. 
 
A. Advancing U.S. Security Interests 
 
The United States should shrink its military and use it 
less often because the costs do not match the benefits derived 
from having a large military force.  The costs are particularly 
unappealing when contrasted with the realistic alternatives.  
The best of these alternatives from the United States‟ 
perspective is a new global order in which other countries 
assume a greater responsibility for defending themselves and 
for dealing with regional security challenges before they 
become global challenges.  Reducing our military power, 
therefore, will advance broader U.S. interests by precipitating 
a more equitable distribution of risks and responsibilities 
across the international system. 
Reducing the United States‟ power would constrain its 
ability to intervene militarily in international conflicts and 
may begin to rectify the imbalance of power between the 
Executive and the other two branches.  Congress regularly 
adds, changes, and deletes items from the White House‟s 
proposed budget for the Department of Defense.  Such ad hoc 
circumventions, however, do not always result in better 
policies.  The United States needs a more comprehensive 
approach to limiting its propensity to intervene, and it should 
create a military that better conforms to a new, more 
restrained grand strategy. 
Righting the imbalance between the acquisition of, and 
application of, force will not be easy.  As this Article has shown, 
America‟s capabilities often dictate its strategies.  Given that 
there are domestic constituencies that favor various forms of 
military spending, these interest groups have often exerted an 
important influence over how much military power America 
has and how it should be used. 
It should operate the other way around, however.  To build 
and sustain a massive military, and to then consider where to 
use it, puts the military cart before the strategic horse.  I favor 
the opposite approach: putting the strategic horse before the 
military cart.  Policymaking entails making choices and a 
willingness to explicitly consider trade-offs between the 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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irrelevant and the urgent, as well as between the nice-to-do 
and the must-do.  These choices also apply to America‟s force 
structure, both the total size of its military, and the mix of 
planes and personnel, ships and submarines, within that 
military. 
 
B. Security, Liberty, and National Interests 
 
In an ideal world, the government would be able to provide 
security for individuals while simultaneously affording them 
considerable freedom to pursue their own ends, provided of 
course that those pursuits did not infringe on the security and 
liberty of others.  In the real world, preserving such liberties 
must exist in constant tension with the government‟s obligation 
to preserve and protect the Republic. 
As explained above, the Founders feared the costs of 
military power.61  Even George Washington, the taciturn 
General who led U.S. forces to victory, and in the process, 
forever established himself as the father of the new nation, 
would have much preferred for the United States to be a nation 
at peace.  Washington especially hoped that the United States 
would remain aloof from other countries‟ wars.  Historian 
Joseph Ellis describes Washington‟s approach to foreign policy 
as grounded in a skeptical, some might even say pessimistic, 
view of an essentially immutable human nature that tended 
inexorably toward conflict.62 
This desire to avoid foreign entanglements with other 
nations combined with the Founders‟ inherent skepticism 
about the utility and efficacy of state action.  The Founders 
measured the costs of war not only in blood and treasure, but 
also in the character of the fledgling Republic—recall 
Madison‟s warning that war was the greatest enemy of 
liberty.63  They therefore defined national interests in ways 
that further constrained the nation‟s propensity to wage war.  
They feared that government power, mobilized for foreign 
policy aims, could just as easily be directed to stifling liberty at 
 
61. See discussion supra Part I(A). 
62. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE WASHINGTON 235-36 
(2005). 
63. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
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home.  These doubts and fears led them to cast a skeptical eye 
on war, and to adopt a very stringent standard for when and 
whether to go to war. 
 
VII.  A New Global Order 
 
A similarly high standard would serve the United States 
well today.  The Founders‟ concerns that wars—and an 
enormous and permanent military to prosecute these wars—
would impose huge costs on our system of government, shift 
the balance between the branches, and expand the 
government‟s authority over the citizenry, have proved 
prescient.  Likewise, we have learned that the costs of waging 
wars are rarely offset by the benefits that derive from them.  
This does not mean that military intervention is never 
warranted; it does, however, mean that we need to more clearly 
define situations in which American military involvement is 
the appropriate course of action. 
Because the preservation of both America‟s physical 
security and way of life depend upon its participation in the 
international system, the United States must remain engaged 
in the world.  Yet it is wrong to assume that the United States 
can only do so from a position of global military dominance.  
The international system exists in spite of—not because of—
the power of any one state.  It is the height of arrogance and 
folly to presume that the world will descend into chaos if the 
United States shapes its military to advance its vital national 
interests and adopts a more discriminating approach toward 
the use of force when those interests are not engaged. 
 
A. New Rules: Four Criteria for Military Intervention 
 
It will be difficult to transition from a current, unipolar 
order to a new, multipolar one.  Other countries will be 
expected to bear additional costs, and many will resist.  
Resistance will also come from within the United States, 
especially from that cadre of Americans who are enamored 
with the idea that it is in the best interest of the United States 
to dominate the global order.  The risks that the United States‟ 
security will be undermined during this transitional period, 
however, can be mitigated by establishing clear and stringent 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/21
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standards, such as those that follow, concerning when and 
whether to use force. 
 
1.  U.S. National Security Must be at Stake 
 
A smaller U.S. military focused on defending core national 
interests cannot be in the business of defending other countries 
that should be defending themselves.  The same principle 
applies to interventions seen as serving a higher humanitarian 
purpose.  Therefore, the United States should only commit to a 
particular military mission overseas if there is a compelling 
U.S. national security interest at stake. 
At first glance, this would seem to be a rather broad 
mandate, but U.S. national security has rarely been threatened 
over the past two decades.  It should be noted that this criteria 
is more stringent than that set forth by the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine, which held that U.S. combat forces should not be sent 
overseas “unless the particular engagement or occasion is 
deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.”64 
Whereas the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine presumed that 
allied interests were essentially synonymous with America‟s, 
one should be extremely wary of equating the two.  The United 
States should revisit its obligations to each and every ally, and 
establish clear criteria for why, under what circumstances, 
and, crucially, by whose authority these obligations might 
translate into the commitment of U.S. military personnel. 
 
2.  Clear National Consensus 
 
The United States should be particularly on guard against 
those situations that separate its own public from decisions of 
whether and when to go to war.  The reason why is quite 
simple, and it relates directly to the second criterion governing 
the use of force: the U.S. military should not be engaged in 
combat operations unless there is a clear national consensus 
behind the mission. 
 
64. Caspar W. Weinberger, Sec‟y of Def., Address Before the National 
Press Club: The Uses of Military Power, (Nov. 28, 1984), in CASPAR 
WEINBERGER, FIGHTING FOR PEACE: SEVEN CRITICAL YEARS IN THE PENTAGON 
441 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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 a. Utilizing Existing Institutions 
 
It is not necessary to create new mechanisms for 
ascertaining public attitudes on such crucial questions; it is 
only necessary to use the tools provided by the Founders.  This 
would entail reasserting Congress‟s constitutional authority 
over the war powers and restoring balance between the 
Executive and Legislative branches of government. 
The Founders did not create a democracy.  They did not 
anticipate, nor did they desire, that important decisions would 
be settled by plebiscite.  They did, however, intend that the 
public would communicate their wishes through their elected 
representatives.  They expected that it would be difficult to 
build a consensus around any particular policy, and they 
deliberately constructed a system aptly described as an 
“invitation to struggle” over important decisions between the 
Executive and Legislative branches.65  At the top of the list was 
the decision to take the country to war—recall Madison‟s 
assertion that the most important passage of the Constitution 
was the assignment of the war power to the legislature, as 
opposed to the Executive branch.66  This crucial provision, 
however, runs counter to modern impulses in United States- 
foreign relations. 
The inclination to play a more active international role—
promulgated after World War II and expanded upon during 
successive rounds of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(“NATO”) expansion in the post-Cold War period—obligates the 
United States to become involved in foreign military conflicts 
without the explicit authorization of Congress.67  Indeed, a key 
objection to the League of Nations charter, one that ultimately 
contributed to the Senate‟s refusal to ratify that treaty, was 
precisely this constitutional concern—that a collective security 
 
65. Ted Galen Carpenter, Global Interventionism and a New Imperial 
Presidency, 71 CATO POL‟Y ANALYSIS, May 16, 1986, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=937&full=1 (quoting EDWARD S. 
CORWIN ET AL., THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 201 (5th 
rev. ed. 1984)). 
66. Madison, supra note 13, at 174. 
67. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 
243. 
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organization would supplant Congress‟s authority as stipulated 
by the Founders.68 
That such constitutional concerns are “now typically 
derided as „isolationist,‟” notes the Cato Institute‟s Stanley 
Kober, “merely indicates how far we have come from the 
founding vision of the United States.”69  In short, Kober 
explains that “the pursuit of alliances has the effect of 
undermining what Madison regarded as the single most 
important characteristic of American democracy.”70 
 
 b.  Accurate Estimation of Costs 
 
Restoring Congress‟s proper role in determining whether 
and when to go to war will not be enough.71  Renegotiating 
security treaties with key allies and terminating trip-wire 
missions around the world that are designed to draw the 
United States into other nations‟ conflicts will not prevent a 
future President or future Congress from choosing to send 
troops into such conflicts.  Cutting the military will not, by 
itself, constrain the government‟s propensity to wage war.  The 
public‟s occasional enthusiasm for war must be tempered by 
ensuring that the related costs are understood. 
Popular support must be built around reasonable 
expectations, as opposed to best-case scenarios.  This consensus 
must be durable enough to survive temporary setbacks, and 
history shows that it is impossible to sustain domestic support 
when the mission does not advance vital national interests.  
The American people offered lukewarm support for the 
humanitarian mission in Somalia in 1993; they demanded a 
change of course when they saw the costs played out in the 
 
68. See, e.g., Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Back to the Womb? Isolationism’s 
Renewed Threat, 74 FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1995, at 2, 3 (noting that 
“Wilson‟s fight for the League of Nations foundered in the Senate” over 
constitutional and power concerns that the organization would create). 
69. Stanley Kober, James Madison vs. Madeleine Albright: The Debate 
Over Collective Security, in NATO ENLARGEMENT: ILLUSIONS AND REALITY 253, 
257 (Ted Galen Carpenter & Barbara Conry eds.,1998). 
70. Id. 
71. See id. at 257-58 (discussing some of the arguments against NATO 
enlargement that were offered over a decade ago, but which are still relevant 
today). 
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streets of Mogadishu.72  The same can be seen with respect to 
the Iraq War: the advocates for war told Americans that the 
war would be cheap and easy.73  The George W. Bush 
administration marketed the war as a mission to overthrow a 
dictator with ties to al-Qaeda and who ran a functioning 
nuclear weapons program.74  Support for the Iraq venture 
evaporated when the public learned the truth.75 
This idea of transparency regarding the price of conflict 
also found favor among some of the Founders.  Whereas some 
people today speak blithely of a “democratic peace” whereby 
democratic states are supposedly less warlike than 
undemocratic ones,76 James Madison was not so naive.  He 
recognized that democracy was no panacea for curing man‟s 
 
72. See ERIC V. LARSEN & BOGDAN SAVYCH, AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT 
FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD 30-36 (2005), 
which describes a study of public attitudes toward foreign military operations 
in Somalia, and which demonstrates that two-thirds of poll respondents 
favored withdrawal from Somalia before the incident where a U.S. Black 
Hawk helicopter was shot down in the Somali capital of Mogadishu in 
October 1993.  The bloody firefight that followed resulted in eighteen U.S. 
Army Rangers killed, and another seventy-six wounded.  The story is told in 
the book (later a movie), MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF 
MODERN WAR (2000). 
73. Before the war began, White House Budget Director Mitch Daniels 
suggested that the war could be prosecuted for a reasonable $20 billion.  
MICHAEL ISIKOFF & DAVID CORN, HUBRIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF SPIN, SCANDAL, 
AND THE SELLING OF THE IRAQ WAR 194-195 (2006).  Iraq war advocate Ken 
Adelman predicted that the entire affair would be a “cakewalk.”  Ken 
Adelman, Op-Ed., Cakewalk in Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at A27. 
74. See ISIKOFF & CORN, supra note 73. 
75. See Ben Arnoldy, US Public’s Support of Iraq War Sliding Faster 
Now, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), Mar. 20, 2007, at 1 (including a 
timeline showing changing public attitudes toward the war in Iraq 
juxtaposed against major events there). 
76. See generally, e.g., Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the 
Democratic Peace, 19 INT‟L SECURITY, Autumn 1994, at 5 (explaining that the 
notion positing that democracies are inherently less warlike than autocracies 
does not survive close scrutiny).  See also CHRISTOPHER LAYNE, PEACE OF 
ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO THE PRESENT 121-22 
(2006) (concluding the same); TONY SMITH, A PACT WITH THE DEVIL: 
WASHINGTON‟S BID FOR WORLD SUPREMACY AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE 
AMERICAN PROMISE 96-114 (2007) (same).  See also generally EDWARD D. 
MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 
GO TO WAR (2005) (endorsing the broad notion of a democratic peace and 
pointing out that immature democracies are no less prone to war than 
autocracies). 
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propensity to wage war.77  He worried that wars of passion—
precipitated by the public‟s desire for revenge, honor, or 
national pride—were every bit as dangerous to liberty as wars 
initiated by princes and kings.78  Madison also sought, 
therefore, ways to restrain the popular impulses that might 
drive the new government toward war. 
The best mechanism, Madison surmised, would be to 
subject “the will of the society to the reason of the society.”79  
People must be made aware that their actions have 
consequences; they must be cognizant of the trade-offs inherent 
in pursuing a military versus non-military course. 
The Federal Government tends to avoid such hard choices.  
Deficit spending enables politicians in Washington to write 
checks today that will be paid for far into the future.  Such 
expenditures may be justifiable in periods of great emergency, 
but nothing that has occurred in the recent past qualifies as 
such an emergency.  A complete reset is needed.  The United 
States should return to Madison‟s preferred solution that “each 
generation should be made to bear the burden of its own wars, 
instead of carrying them on, at the expence of other 
generations.”80  In other words, there should be no more waging 
wars on credit.  Forcing the advocates for war to consider the 
costs of war ahead of time, including an explicit accounting of 
how it will be paid for and what other expenditures will be cut 
or what taxes will be raised, will help to frame the decision to 
go to war as a choice against competing priorities. 
 
3.  Clear and Obtainable Military Objectives 
 
The third criterion that should constrain our 
interventionist impulses is closely related to the second, 
because the likely costs of military intervention cannot be 
established without knowing what the troops will do.  The 
government should not involve the United States military in 
foreign operations without clear and obtainable military 
objectives.  Further, every plan for getting into a war must 
 
77. See generally James Madison, Universal Peace, NAT‟L GAZETTE, Feb. 
2, 1792, reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 11, at 88. 
78. See generally id. 
79. Id. at 89. 
80. Id. at 90.  See also Kober, supra note 69, at 258. 
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have an equally detailed plan for getting out. 
Such questions are practically irrelevant when a country‟s 
very survival is at stake; the British and the Soviets did not 
ask for an exit strategy when the Nazis were bearing down on 
them, for example.  The criteria discussed here, however, 
pertain to wars of choice—initiated because they will advance 
national security.  Once the advocates for war have shown how 
the nation‟s interests will be served by military intervention, 
and once the public has signaled its willingness to support the 
cause, including agreeing to pay for it, the military‟s role 
should be limited to achieving military objectives.  Non-
military objectives, including attempting to fashion a new 
political order that would bring contending factions together, or 
engaging in post-conflict reconstruction projects to repair 
physical infrastructure damaged, not by the war, but by years 
of neglect by previous governments, are costly and unnecessary 
missions for a military focused on fighting and winning wars. 
Colin Powell was speaking to the problem of post-conflict 
reconstruction in his famous “Pottery Barn” principle: “[y]ou 
break it, you buy it.”81  What Powell actually said to President 
Bush in August 2002, according to Bob Woodward‟s account of 
the exchange, was even more perceptive: “[y]ou are going to be 
the proud owner of 25 million people.”82  Powell warned the 
President, “[y]ou will own all their hopes, aspirations and 
problems. . . .  It‟s going to suck the oxygen out of everything.”83 
Another prominent military leader, Major General David 
Petraeus, had similar concerns about the tendency of wars to 
drag on for years.  As he prepared to lead the 101st Airborne 
Division across the border separating Kuwait from Iraq in 
March 2003, Petraeus was haunted by a nagging question.  
Despite the fact that Saddam Hussein‟s days in power were 
clearly numbered, Petraeus asked aloud “[t]ell me how this 
ends?”84 
 
81. BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 150 (2004). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Rick Atkinson, A Long and Blinding Road to Battle in Iraq: 
Unexpected Challenges Tested Commander of 101st Airborne, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 7, 2004, at A1.  See also LINDA ROBINSON, TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS: 
GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS AND THE SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT OF IRAQ (2008); 
Christopher Dickey, The Story of O, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at A12. 
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Petraeus and Powell understood that it is rather easy to 
start wars, but awfully difficult to end them.  Policymakers 
must explicitly account for this when choosing to send United 
States troops to war. 
 
4.  Use of Force as a Last Resort 
 
The first three criteria are not sufficient to establish the 
wisdom and legitimacy of military intervention.  The American 
people will support the use of force when national security 
interests are at stake, but that does not by itself make 
intervention acceptable.  After all, the United States has the 
ability to incinerate any place on earth in a matter of minutes.  
That obviously does not imply a right to do so.  This leads to 
the fourth and final rule governing foreign military 
intervention: force should only be used as a last resort, and 
only after other measures for dealing with the particular 
national security threat have been exhausted. 
Civilized societies abhor warfare.  Even wars initiated for 
the right reasons, and waged with due respect for international 
norms, represent, in a real sense, a failure to resolve matters 
by peaceful means.  America‟s current policymakers must 
remember this timeless rule, even—or perhaps especially—
when the capacity for waging war seems nearly limitless. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
George Washington, in his Farewell Address, and Thomas 
Jefferson, in his First Inaugural Address, both admonished 
their countrymen to steer clear of the internal affairs of foreign 
powers, and both were anxious for the United States to avoid 
unnecessary wars.  Such comments did not imply a disregard 
for human rights; only that their greatest concern was for 
maintaining their new nation as a shining example of freedom 
for the world.  These sentiments were perhaps best expressed 
on July 4, 1821, by John Quincy Adams who declared, 
“[America] goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.  
She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.  
She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”85 
 
85. John Quincy Adams, Address Delivered at the Request of the 
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Though the advocates of benevolent global hegemony 
scorned Adams‟s vision as synonymous with “cowardice and 
dishonor,”86 we can see—given that their strategy has sapped 
the United States‟ strength and undermined its security—what 
a wise standard it was.  Americans would be richer, freer, and 
safer if they adhered more closely to standards such as those 
proposed in this Article. 
These criteria are hardly revolutionary; as already 
discussed, they mirror the precepts of the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine from the Reagan era, as well as aspects of just-war 
theory that have been around for centuries.  America, however, 
has lost sight of them in recent years.  Its capacity for waging 
war has enabled the country to avoid discussions of whether a 
particular intervention was truly necessary.  In solving its 
power problem and by adapting its military to meet the 
changing security needs of the twenty-first century, it is 
imperative that the United States reduce and reshape its 
military to focus on vital national security interests.  
Americans can no longer afford to be distracted by challenges 
that can and should be handled by others.  Accordingly, 
America‟s default position should be one of non-intervention 
and the burden of proof should shift, as the Founders had 
intended, to the advocates of military intervention.  Exercising 
greater restraint in American foreign policy will help restore 
balance between the Executive and Legislative branches and 
return the nation to its founding principles. 
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